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SEC RULES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: SPECIALIZED
DISCLOSURE FOR CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY
VERNA KRISHNAMURTHY*
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) rules
promulgated through amendments to the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934 mandated by federal legislation serve as a means of
reaching U.S. companies that are expanding their operations
overseas. These rules are conceived of as an accountability
mechanism, wherein companies choosing to operate in
jurisdictions with weak rules of law are required to report on
aspects of their activities affecting human rights in those countries.
The corporate disclosure requirements found in the SEC final rule,
promulgated through the amendment made in the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act Section 1502, is
an example of this approach with regard to companies using
conflict minerals. The experience of companies subject to reporting
requirements under Dodd-Frank Section 1502 provides important
considerations that must be made for the proposed specialized
disclosure requirement in the Global Online Freedom Act for ICT
companies dealing with government surveillance and censorship
demands abroad, going beyond the transparency that would result
from reporting. Although SEC specialized corporate disclosure
requirements are an effective means of increasing transparency
among U.S. issuers, they will not lead to long-term changes in
industry practice if not combined with greater involvement in
multi-stakeholder efforts, increased awareness among investors
with leverage on company decision-making, and effective internal
initiatives within companies themselves.
Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act amends Section 13 of the Securities and
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Exchange Act of 1934 to authorize promulgation of rules requiring
issuers to disclose annually information about minerals sourced
from the Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”) and adjoining
countries.1 Section 1502 outlines a reporting requirement that
involves “a description of the measures taken by the person to
exercise due diligence on the source and chain of custody of such
minerals,”2 including a certified independent private sector audit, a
determination of whether the minerals are “DRC Conflict Free,”
and efforts to make the information obtained through due
diligence available to the public.3 The law was passed in response
to a growing movement among consumers, Non-Governmental
Organizations (“NGOs”), and various legislators, who recognized
the connection between the atrocities committed as part of an
ongoing regional conflict in a number of Central African nations
and U.S. companies producing consumer electronics sold to the
American public.4 One of the major functions of the corporate
disclosure requirements on conflict minerals in Section 1502 is to
“promote transparency and consumer awareness regarding the use
of sought-after minerals extracted in and around DRC.”5
Accordingly, Section 1502 developed a specialized corporate
disclosure approach designed to hold U.S. companies accountable
for their supply chain connection to human rights abuses
committed in the DRC and adjoining countries.
1 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 1502, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
2 Id.
3 Id. at 2214.
4
See, e.g., Metals in Mobile Phones Help Finance Congo Atrocities, GLOBAL
WITNESS (Feb. 16, 2009), http://www.globalwitness.org/library/metals-mobilephones-help-finance-congo-atrocities (noting research revealing that armed
groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”) financed their operations
through the minerals trade); A Comprehensive Approach to Congo’s Conflict Minerals
– Strategy Paper, THE ENOUGH PROJECT AND THE GRASSROOTS RECONCILIATION
GROUP
(Apr.
24,
2009),
http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/comprehensive-approach-conflictminerals-strategy-paper (highlighting the responsibility of companies that may be
sourcing minerals from the DRC to ensure they are not fueling the region’s
conflict); Conflict Minerals Trade Act, H.R. 4128, 111th Cong. § 2(10) (2009–2010)
(acknowledging that “[m]ineral derivatives from the Democratic Republic of
Congo are used in industrial and technology products worldwide, including
mobile telephones, laptop computers, and digital video recorders.”).
5 Emily Veale, Is There Blood on Your Hands-Free Device?: Examining Legislative
Approaches to the Conflict Minerals Problem in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 21
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 503, 522 (2013) [hereinafter Veale, Is There Blood on
Your Hands-Free Device?].
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The SEC’s final rule on corporate disclosure relating to conflict
minerals was passed in August 2012.6 The final rule applies to any
company required to file reports with the SEC under the Exchange
Act of 1934 who use the minerals tin, tantalum, tungsten, or gold
where these are “‘necessary to the functionality or production’ of a
product manufactured or contracted to be manufactured by th[at]
company.”7 As a first step, countries using any of the designated
minerals must conduct a reasonable “country of origin” inquiry.8
If the company knows or has reason to believe the minerals come
from the DRC region based on their inquiry, it must conduct due
diligence on its supply chain and file a Conflict Minerals Report to
make a determination regarding whether the minerals are “DRC
Conflict Free” or “Not Been Found to Be ‘DRC Conflict Free.’”9
Due diligence must conform to a nationally or internationally
recognized due diligence framework and is subject to an
independent private sector audit and certification requirement.10
The final rule also allows a two-year phase-in period for large
companies (four years for smaller reporting companies) to adjust to
the disclosure requirements, during which a company that is
unable to determine the origin of its minerals from due diligence
can designate those minerals as “DRC Conflict Undeterminable” in
their Conflict Minerals Report.11 All reporting under the SEC final
rule must be made publicly available on each company’s website,
whether or not the minerals are determined to be “DRC Conflict
Free.”12
The required corporate disclosure on conflict minerals is
significant because it attempts to hold accountable those
companies that may be complicit in human rights abuses
committed by foreign governments. The SEC determined that the
reporting requirement would help investors price securities of
relevant companies based on the reported information and would
generally increase transparency and informational efficiency in the
6 See generally Conflict Minerals, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No.
34-67716, 2012 WL 3611799 (Aug. 22, 2012) [hereinafter Conflict Minerals Release].
7
Fact Sheet: Disclosing the Use of Conflict Minerals, SEC.GOV,
http://www.sec.gov/News/Article/Detail/Article/1365171562058#.UqIwARbv
yu5 [hereinafter SEC Fact Sheet].
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
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market.13 However, there have been a number of criticisms against
using an SEC rule as an accountability mechanism within the
international human rights context. Two major problems with the
SEC rule promulgated under Dodd-Frank Section 1502 are that the
rule does not fall within the typical corporate decision making
framework and that it has not produced any results in changing
industry practice because of delays in implementation.
The SEC rule on conflict minerals, as mentioned previously, is
not like other typical reporting requirements because it does not
directly serve the main corporate interest of profit maximization
and shareholder benefit. The SEC is required to consider whether
the rules they promulgate will “promote efficiency, competition,
and capital formation.”14 This duty resonates with the traditional
and principal end goals of corporate decision making to maximize
profit and value for shareholders of the company.15 Human rights
abuses committed in the DRC and adjoining countries are,
arguably, not directly relevant to a corporation’s profits or
shareholder benefit. In fact, opponents commenting on the
proposed conflict minerals rule argued that the Conflict Minerals
Report required would include information outside the scope of
what is considered material to investors.16
In response to legal challenges mounted by the Chamber of
Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the
Business Roundtable, the Interfaith Center on Corporate
Responsibility (“ICCR”) reinforced its view that the SEC conflict
minerals reporting requirement is based on concerns that are
integral to investor materiality.17 In comments made to the
13
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, No. 13-cv-635 (RLW), 2013 WL 4010670
(D.D.C. 2013) (citing 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,350).
14
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(f), 48 Stat. 881 (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 78c(f) 2012).
15
See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its
Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970 (“’[T]here is one and only one social
responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed
to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to
say, engages in open and free competition without deception or fraud.’”). Id.
(quoting MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962)).
16
See, e.g., Conflict Minerals, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No.
34-63547, 2011 WL 840408 (Mar. 1, 2011) (asserting that the purpose of the
disclosure called for in the proposed rule is “fundamentally different” from the
purposes of rules typically promulgated within the Securities Exchange Act
reporting system).
17
See Investor Statement in Support of SEC Rule 1502 on Conflict Minerals,
SOURCING
NETWORK
(June
3,
2013),
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proposed rule and submitted to the SEC, the ICCR and the Social
Investment Forum (“SIF”) asserted that proper disclosure in
reporting will allow socially responsible investors to better “assess
social (i.e. human rights) and reputational risks . . . associated with
The
sourcing from the Democratic Republic of Congo.”18
organizations further stated that the materiality argument was
particularly compelling, considering that Socially Responsible
Investment (“SRI”) assets had grown significantly in recent years
to represent a large population of investors who would deem an
electronics company’s potential ties to human rights abuses in
DRC relevant to their investment decisions.19
The administrative response to similar arguments made by
industry actors is consistent with that of SRI associations. The SEC
posited that the cost of compliance, though significant, may be
partly offset by “’increased demand’” for conflict-free products
and “’shares by socially responsible consumers and investors.’”20
Through their materiality arguments, government and investor
supporters of specialized corporate disclosure for conflict minerals
have indicated that the information obtained through due
diligence and reported and published by companies is material for
investors for whom social and reputational issues are relevant
considerations in making investment decisions. In the context of
conflict minerals, however, the industry backlash to the reporting
requirements alone evince the notion that, for corporate actors,
http://www.sourcingnetwork.org/storage/minerals-investorsgroup/CM%20Investor%20Statement%202013-05-28%20FIN.pdf (opposing the
lawsuit filed against the SEC and challenging the final rule on conflict minerals on
behalf of investment groups representing over $450 billion of assets under
management).
18
See Comments Regarding File Number S7-40-10 on Conflict Minerals
Disclosure, Letter from Lauren Compere et al., Managing Director, Boston
Common Asset Management, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n
Sec’y (Mar. 2, 2011) (arguing that conflict minerals disclosure provides material
information to investors and will improve market efficiency), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010-158.pdf [hereinafter Letter from
SIF and ICCR]; see also REBECCA MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED: THE
WORLDWIDE STRUGGLE FOR INTERNET FREEDOM 176 (2012) [hereinafter CONSENT OF
THE NETWORKED] (“By 2010 the amount of assets held by US investors in some
form of socially responsible investment funds . . . had reached $3.07 trillion out of
a total of $25.2 trillion in the US investment marketplace.”).
19 See Letter from SIF and ICCR, supra note 18 (noting that SRI assets were up
by 34% since 2005).
20
See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, No. 13-cv-635 (RLW), 2013 WL 4010670
(D.D.C. 2013) (quoting the SEC in 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,350).
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humanitarian concerns in the DRC are not enough incentive on
their face to expend the time and resources necessary to comply
with the final rule. Furthermore, the mere fact that so many
industry actors have challenged the rule on these grounds shows
that companies are not yet faced with enough push for policy
change on the investor level to make efforts to change their supply
chain practices on their own. Therefore, the arguably expansive
reporting requirements promulgated under Dodd-Frank Section
1502 conflict with the traditional calculus of corporate decision
makers, which is based primarily on profit maximization rather
than social concerns.
The second major failure of the SEC final rule for corporate
disclosure on conflict minerals is its time delay and resulting
ineffectiveness in effecting industry-level change. A significant
amount of time stood between the passage of Dodd-Frank and the
promulgation of the corresponding SEC final rule.21 This is
important to note because Dodd-Frank’s Section 1502 amendment
to the Securities and Exchange Act mandated that the final rule be
set forth by the SEC no later than nine months after Dodd-Frank’s
passage, which would have been April 2011.22 The SEC released a
proposed rule in December 2010, and allowed a period for
comments on the proposed rule until January 31, 2011.23 This
comment period was then extended to March 2, 2011, so that the
SEC could collect further information.24 The final rule was not
released until August 22, 2012, more than two years after the
passage of Dodd-Frank Section 1502.25 Companies were not
required to submit reports pursuant to the final rule until May 31,
2014.26 However, due to pending litigation on the final rule in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, the SEC issued a
statement moving the deadline for reporting to June 2, 2014,
21 Compare Dodd–Frank, supra note 1, with Conflict Minerals, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240,
249b (2012) (effective on Nov. 13, 2012).
22 See Veale, supra note 5, at 524 (“Dodd-Frank’s amendment of the Exchange
Act requires that the SEC issue final rules implementing the statutory
requirements no later than nine months after the date of enactment, or April
2011.”).
23 Id.
24 Id. at 524–25 n.164 (citing Conflict Minerals, Extension of Comment Period,
76
Fed.
Reg.
6110
(Feb.
3,
2011),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2011/34-63793fr.pdf).
25 See generally Conflict Minerals, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, supra note 21.
26 Veale, supra note 5, at 525.
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awaiting a decision from the Court.27 While the reporting
requirement was upheld by the D.C. Circuit Court, many
companies will be able to take advantage of the aforementioned
phase-in period whereby companies can deem their products as
“DRC Conflict Undeterminable” in their Conflict Minerals Report
if they are unable to determine the origin of their minerals
definitively through their due diligence methods.28 This phase-in
period is two years for larger reporting companies, and four years
for smaller reporting companies.29
The breakdown of the procedure through which Section 1502
was implemented represents the procedural drawback of
attempting to hold companies accountable for their use of conflict
minerals through specialized corporate disclosure requirements.
The implication of the above timeframe is that for many
companies, a final determination on the status of an issuer’s
mineral use is not required until 2018. This means that effective
transparency on conflict minerals use will not be achieved until
almost a decade after the requirement was conceived in Section
1502. The long and drawn-out process of achieving effective
transparency through SEC corporate disclosure requirements has a
particularly unfortunate impact in the human rights context
because of the on-the-ground effect. An issuer subject to reporting
requirements may be unknowingly participating in the sale of
conflict minerals and funding of armed groups in the DRC and
adjoining countries up to the point at which they obtain adequate
information on their supply chain. For a conflict that has killed
approximately 5.4 million people since 1996, procedural lags could
translate into hundreds of thousands more lives lost.30 The use of
specialized corporate disclosure to hold U.S. companies
accountable for their potential complicity in human rights abuses
committed in the DRC and adjoining companies will thus take a
greater amount of time to produce real results than other potential
accountability routes.
27
Cory Hester, SEC Commissioners Issue Joint Statement on Status of Conflict
Minerals Rules, WESTLAW CAPITAL MARKETS DAILY BRIEFING, 2014 WL 1672573 (Apr.
29, 2014).
28 SEC Fact Sheet, supra note 7.
29 Id.
30
See
Eastern
Congo,
ENOUGH
PROJECT,
http://www.enoughproject.org/conflicts/eastern_congo (last visited Jan. 28,
2015) (“Since 1996 the International Rescue Committee has calculated that
approximately 5.4 million people have died from war-related causes.”).
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The Global Online Freedom Act (“GOFA”) is a more recent
effort to address corporate accountability for human rights issues
overseas, targeting companies within the ICT sector operating in
countries with restrictions on their citizens’ use of the Internet.
GOFA was first introduced in Congress in 2006, in response to a
disclosure of information by Yahoo! in China that led to the
imprisonment of Chinese dissidents by the Chinese government.31
It was thus passed to address those U.S. companies who “for the
sake of market share and profits . . . have compromised both the
integrity of their product and their duties as responsible corporate
citizens” by providing information to sovereign governments that
are used to enforce questionable human rights practices with
regard to freedom of expression and privacy.32
The SEC rule envisioned by GOFA is similar to the rule
pursuant to Dodd-Frank Section 1502 because it aims to hold
corporate entities operating within restrictive human rights
environments accountable through a human rights due diligence
requirement to produce greater transparency. Section 201 of the
latest version of the Global Online Freedom Act proposes an
amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to create a rule
requiring companies operating in State Department-designated
“Internet-restricting countries” to include in their annual report
“[c]ompany policies applicable to the company’s internal
operations that address human rights due diligence through a
statement of policy . . . .”33 This policy must outline clear
expectations for all parties under the company’s control operating
in relevant countries.34 The policy and corresponding human
rights due diligence must also be made publicly available and
adequately communicated, and must be “independently assessed
by a third party to demonstrate compliance in practice . . . .”35
Companies who participate in good standing with a multistakeholder initiative that requires its corporate members to
undergo independent third party assessments are exempted from

31 See Ian Brown, The Global Online Freedom Act, 14 GEO. J. OF INT’L. AFF. 153,
154 (2013) (discussing the evolution of the Global Online Freedom Act).
32 See id. at 155 (quoting GOFA sponsor Representative Christopher Smith’s
remarks on the proposed legislation).
33 H.R. 491, 113th Cong. § 201 (1st Sess. 2013).
34 Id.
35 Id.
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the reporting requirement.36
The SEC rule proposed by GOFA, like the conflict minerals
rule, requires that due diligence conforms to an internationally
recognized framework and is assessed through an independent
third party audit for compliance. GOFA requires that the
statement of policy addressing the company’s human rights due
diligence must be “consistent with applicable provisions of the
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises issued by the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development . . . .”37
In the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) provides
general guidelines for companies operating in multiple
jurisdictions on operating their business in a manner consistent
Some relevant
with internationally recognized standards.38
provisions within the Guidelines are those that obligate companies
to “[s]eek ways to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights
impacts that are directly linked to their business operations” and
“[c]arry out human rights due diligence as appropriate to their
size, the nature and context of operations and the severity of the
risks of adverse human rights impacts.”39 The OECD Guidelines
are currently the only such government-approved code of conduct
on the international level.40 Through these provisions, the OECD
Guidelines are a means of providing ICT companies with some
guidance on conducting human rights due diligence and
formulating policies for their operations as required by the
proposed GOFA rule. However, the provisions are very broad and
simply cover human rights due diligence in general. Notably, the
Guidelines make no mention of due diligence mechanisms or
policies that are specific to the cross-section between freedom of
expression and companies operating within restrictive regimes.41
Id.
Id.
38
See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 31 (2011) [hereinafter OECD GUIDELINES] (providing
background on the history and purpose of the Guidelines).
39 Id at 31.
40 Id. at 3.
41
See Anupam Chander, Googling Freedom, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 8 (2011)
(“Corporate responsibility codes such as the United Nations Global Compact and
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises rarely mention free speech outside a
general call for corporations to respect human rights.”) (footnotes omitted).
36
37
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Much like the use of the OECD Guidelines guides company
policymaking, the requirement for an independent third-party
assessment for compliance invokes the involvement of outside
actors in helping change policy and practice in the ICT sector with
regard to human rights. GOFA specifically references the expertise
of multi-stakeholder initiatives that promote “the rule of law and
the adoption of laws, policies, and practices that protect, respect,
and fulfill freedom of expression and privacy.”42 GOFA defers to
multi-stakeholder initiatives to provide specific guidelines for
conducting human rights due diligence and shaping policies to
deal with freedom of expression and privacy issues, as evidenced
by its safe harbor provision, exempting companies who participate
in these initiatives from the reporting requirements under the SEC
rule.43 The Global Network Initiative (“GNI”) is referenced by
name in GOFA as a multi-stakeholder initiative, providing
guidance to companies for developing adequate strategies to
address human rights in Internet-restricting countries.44
For its part, the GNI requires all of its members to conduct
human rights impact assessments to obtain information on
potential freedom of expression and privacy risks to users.45 The
human rights impact assessments would be conducted each time a
company reviews and revises its procedures for dealing with
government requests for user information; enters a new market;
evaluates potential partners, investments and suppliers; or
develops new technologies, products, and services.46 The GNI’s
Implementation Guidelines outline the methods that should be
used for human rights assessments focused on threats to freedom
of expression and privacy, including one that the actors’ companies
should consult with and prioritize their use of assessments.47 The
GNI also requires its company participants to undergo an
H.R. 491, 113th Cong. § 201, at 21 (1st Sess. 2013).
See id. (“An Internet communications service company that operates in an
Internet-restricting country shall not be required to include the annual report of
the company information described in paragraph (1) if the company includes in
the annual report of the company [proof of participation in a multi-stakeholder
initiative”).
44
Id.
45
Global Network Initiative, Implementation Guidelines for the Principles on
Freedom
of
Expression
and
Privacy,
at
2,
https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/implementationguidelines/index.php.
46 Id.
47 Id.
42
43
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independent third-party assessment of the type of method
required under the proposed reporting requirement, which would
supervise the work of an independent assessor who is selected by
the company from a pool of assessors approved by the GNI
board.48 While multi-stakeholder initiatives, like the GNI, are more
constructive than the OECD Guidelines in providing a framework
for companies falling under the reporting requirements in GOFA
Section 201,49 these initiatives are completely voluntary and
private, and thus, do not carry the same weight as do legal
obligations for companies.50
The reporting requirements envisioned in GOFA present some
of the same challenges as those contained in Dodd-Frank Section
1502, highlighting major gaps in using specialized corporate
disclosure as a means of addressing human rights issues faced by
U.S. issuers overseas.51 The first of these gaps is that transparency
is only the first step in a much larger process needed to hold
companies accountable and change corporate practice with regard
to human rights abuses committed within foreign jurisdictions.
The end result of specialized corporate disclosure requirements
under Dodd-Frank and GOFA would be greater availability of
information about company practices that might otherwise be
difficult for consumers and investors to obtain. Legislation
requiring corporate disclosure on human rights issues is supported
by the belief that one way to change company policies is to
encourage transparency and to encourage invested actors to
develop campaigns to bring the human rights issues to public
attention, to the point where companies are incentivized to change
their policies and practices.52 However, the mere availability of
information will not change a company’s decision-making
practices or policy, unless the information is harnessed as part of a
larger movement. Without activist efforts to seek out information
48
See Global Network Initiative, Governance, Accountability and Learning
Framework,
https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/governanceframework/index.php (outlining
the responsibilities of the Board and participating companies in regards to the
independent assessment process).
49
OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 38, at Sec. 201.
50
See Chander, supra note 41, at 38 (“[T]he private initiative lacks the legal
sanctions available to enforce a statutory obligation.”).
51
Dodd–Frank Act, supra note 1.
52
Telephone Interview with Michael Samway, Adjunct Assistant Professor,
Georgetown University (Nov. 8, 2013).
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reported pursuant to SEC rules and published on a company’s
website, along with the use of this information as part of a
concerted effort to change industry practice, transparency itself
will not hold companies accountable.
The SEC rule outlined in GOFA arguably addresses the
transparency conundrum more effectively than Dodd-Frank
Section 1502. The final rule on conflict minerals requires only that
relevant companies conduct due diligence on their supply chain
and publish a determination on the origin of their minerals based
on this method.53 As a result, although the rule requires an
approved process for compliance by the company to obtain and
publish information on its supply chain, it leaves it up to
consumers and investors to use this information to lobby the
industry to change its sourcing practices. It is perhaps for this
reason that so many NGOs and investor groups have published
information on how and why their consumers and investors can
use this information and their leverage to give companies a reason
to change their practices.54 The GOFA rule, on the other hand,
contains elements that attempt to bridge the gap between
transparency and changes in industry practice. Section 201 not
only requires companies to report due diligence methods but also
develop and report company policies that outline expectations for
employees, as communicated to business partners and “reflected in
operational policies and procedures necessary to embed it
throughout the company.”55 This additional component in the
proposed reporting requirement in GOFA obligates companies to
operationalize their due diligence by setting forth a corresponding
53
See SEC Fact Sheet, supra note 7 (stating that the final steps in reporting
under the SEC final rule on conflict minerals are the due diligence determination
and the independent private sector audit).
54
See, e.g., Sasha Lezhnev and Alexandra Hellmuth, Taking Conflict Out of
Consumer Gadgets: Company Rankings on Conflict Minerals 2012, ENOUGH PROJECT,
Aug. 2012, at 2, 8 (including a ranking of major efforts of major electronics
companies in tracing their supply chains and calling on consumers to ask
“companies to publish company policies on this issue, join industry and
multistakeholder groups . . . and invest in cleanly sourced minerals from the
region that benefit local communities.”); see also Conflict Minerals Program
Overview,
RESPONSIBLE
SOURCING
NETWORK,
http://www.sourcingnetwork.org/minerals/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2015)
(including a list of common products that may contain conflict minerals and
encouraging investors to research company policies on conflict minerals and
check proxy statements for resolutions on risk analysis or policies to clean up
supply chains).
55 H.R. 491, 113th Cong. § 201, at 19 (1st Sess. 2013).
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change in company policy.
GOFA, thereby, addresses the
problematic sole requirement of transparency by at least requiring
companies to take the next step needed to change their practices.
The second gap in specialized disclosure to address corporate
complicity in human rights abuses is the danger of “naming and
shaming” with regard to information published on company
websites, as mandated by both the final rule on conflict minerals
and the GOFA requirement.56 The threat of naming and shaming,
which is typically done largely through the work of NGOs, is
meant to raise awareness on human rights issues, as well as to
draw attention to those corporate actors that these NGOs believe
are not making an adequate effort to address such issues in their
operations.57 Naming and shaming, when done properly, is
effective in bringing international human rights issues to the
public’s attention because it allows advocacy groups to create
something that resonates with the broader public and connects the
individual to the human rights issue by way of a product or service
provided by a brand she recognizes.58 Naming and shaming is,
oftentimes, the only effective way of bringing about change in
company practice because companies avoid complicity with
human rights abuses to prevent reputational damage. However,
the naming and shaming approach also lends itself to the danger of
antagonizing companies into creating short-term, media-driven
solutions, instead of incentivizing companies to affect long-term
policy changes. This approach could potentially run against the
stated goals of reporting requirements in GOFA and Dodd-Frank
to incentivize the relevant industries to provide products and
services that consumers can trust. In situations where it is possible
for a company to engage with a foreign market while complying
with human rights standards at home in the United States, the
naming and shaming approach could cause a company to
disengage instead of cleaning up its practices.
Naming and shaming was effective in shaping the industry’s
56 See, e.g., H.R. 491, 113th Cong. §201, at 17–18, 21 (1st Sess. 2013) (requiring
companies to include detailed information regarding their human rights due
diligence on their public company websites).
57
See Veale, Is There Blood on Your Hands-Free Device?, supra note 5, at 532
(explaining the role and techniques used by NGOs for corporate accountability on
conflict minerals).
58 See Telephone Interview with Michael Samway, Adjunct Assistant
Professor, Georgetown University (Nov. 8, 2013) (discussing effective practices in
working to change company policies).
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positive response to tackling conflict minerals in supply chains. In
2009, Thaisarco Smelting and Refining Co. was referenced in a
report by the NGO Global Witness as a company “involved in the
trade in minerals from eastern DRC” and was thus publicly
implicated in helping to fund the regional conflict.59 Thaisarco
suspended all purchases of tin ore from the DRC, partially in
response to Global Witness’s report.60 This decision was made in
spite of the fact that Thaisarco had already been in the process of
developing a certification scheme to clean up its supply chain at
the time the Global Witness report was released.61 In announcing
its decision, Thaisarco stated that “’although [it was] acting entirely
lawfully, the threat of misleading and bad publicity remain[ed] for
anyone who participate[d] in DRC tin trade.’”62 Had Thaisarco
continued with its efforts to create a viable certification scheme, it
might have been able to pursue profit opportunities in the DRC
while also cleaning up its supply chain and strengthening its
commitment to human rights in the region. This scenario
represents the aforementioned situation where the company can
engage with the foreign market while complying with human
rights standards at home.
Antagonizing a company into
eliminating their profit opportunities to avoid being shamed
publicly through the use of reported information will not
encourage companies to develop policies that reflect greater
respect for human rights. Instead, such antagonizing could cause
companies to exit the foreign market completely.
Although naming and shaming was a corporate concern even
before Dodd-Frank Section 1502 came into play, it was clearly a
relevant concern for companies during the drafting and formation
of the final rule. A number of companies submitting comments to
the proposed rule objected to the broad classification of cassiterite,
wolframite, gold and tantalum as “conflict minerals” without
distinguishing those that did not contribute to human rights
abuses in DRC.63 One industry commentator argued that such a
59
GLOBAL WITNESS, COMPANIES INVOLVED IN THE TRADE IN MINERALS FROM
EASTERN DRC 1 (2009).
60 Veale, Is There Blood on Your Hands-Free Device?, supra note 5, at 533.
61 Id.
62
Id. (citing Joe Bavier, Thaisarco Suspends Congo Tin Ore Purchases, REUTERS
(Sept.
18,
2009),
available
at
http://
af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/idAFJOE58H09S20090918).
63 See Conflict Minerals Release, supra note 6, at 16 (noting that a number of
corporate commentators to the proposed SEC rule believed that a blanket
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classification would impose “’a reputational taint on these entire
industries’ and ’makes it highly challenging for companies in these
industries to communicate effectively with investors and the
public.’”64 A similar objection was made to the provision in the
proposed rule requiring companies to characterize their products
as “not having been found to be ‘DRC conflict free.’”65 In National
Association of Manufacturers, et al. v. Securities and Exchange
Commission, Plaintiffs argued that “[t]he compelled disclosure is
intended to serve as a ‘scarlet letter.’”66 These challenges by
industry actors demonstrate a concern among companies that the
naming and shaming that may result from the information
required to be disclosed in the SEC rule may lead to a misinformed
and unnecessarily negative perception of the company. Where a
company has made active efforts to clean up its supply chain and
has the potential to engage in the market without contributing to
human rights abuses, it should be encouraged to continue its
efforts to implement changes in its policy. In this sense, a naming
and shaming strategy that causes companies to withdraw from the
market for fear of reputational damage instead of changing longterm company practice is counterproductive.
The fear of public naming and shaming exists in the realm of
ICT companies operating in Internet-restricting regimes as well.
The public shaming of Yahoo! after it provided information to the
Chinese government, which led to the arrest of dissident journalist
Shi Tao, sparked a general call to evaluate the practices of Internet
service providers working in restrictive markets.67 Responding to
public attention drawn by the incident, Yahoo! made an explicit
commitment to the human rights of its users around the world
through collective action, compliance practices, information
restrictions, and government engagement.68 Although Yahoo! did
classification of the four minerals as “conflict minerals” would unfairly stigmatize
the entire industry).
64 See id. (quoting Niotan II’s letter regarding the proposed rule).
65
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, No. 13-cv-635 (RLW), 2013 WL 4010670
(D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Plaintiff’s brief) (internal quotations omitted).
66 Id. (quoting Plaintiff’s brief) (internal quotations omitted).
67
See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “RACE TO THE BOTTOM”: CORPORATE
COMPLICITY IN CHINESE INTERNET CENSORSHIP
(2006),
available
at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/china0806/china0806webwcover.pdf.
68
See id. at Appendix VII: Liu Xiaobo’s Letter to Yahoo!, at 114, available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/china0806/15.htm#_Toc142395845
(outlining Yahoo!’s commitment made to U.S. Congress in February 2006
following the Shi Tao hearings in regard to freedom of expression and privacy in
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make a number of efforts to deliver on its commitment to promote
human rights in Internet-restricting countries, it quickly
transformed aspects of its operations in China, culminating with its
handing over business operations serving the Chinese market to
the Chinese company Alibaba.69 This response is similar to the
approach taken by the aforementioned Thaisarco and Global
Witness, where the company responded defensively to public
naming and shaming by withdrawing from markets that drew risk
and negative attention to its brand. Although in the Yahoo! case,
unlike that of Thaisarco, there may not have been any way to
engage in the market without contributing to human rights abuses,
in both cases the citizens of foreign countries continued to be
subject to these abuses.
If specialized corporate disclosure is meant to change company
policies in the long-term and facilitate the creation of effective
industry-wide practice in dealing with human rights issues, it must
not use an approach that antagonizes companies into pulling out of
the markets in question to avoid addressing these issues.
Withdrawal from these markets could create a vacuum to be filled
by corporations of other nations that do not have the accountability
measures used to restrict U.S. companies.70 In those circumstances
where it is possible for the U.S. company to implement policies, or
at least make an effort to change policies in the long-term that
would allow them to continue to engage with the foreign market
while also upholding high human rights standards, they should be
encouraged to do so. As stated in a critique of GOFA’s ultimate
effects in China, “U.S. legislators may want to consider whether it
is better to have U.S. or Russian, Indian, North Korean, and
Japanese IT companies enabling Beijing’s Internet restriction.”71
China).
69
See Catherine Shu, Yahoo China Shuts Down Its Web Portal, TECHCRUNCH
(Sept. 1, 2013), available at http://techcrunch.com/2013/09/01/yahoo-chinashuts-down-its-web-portal/ (discussing the process by which Yahoo operations in
China were taken over and eventually phased out by Alibaba Group); see also Our
Work: Shi Tao, AMNESTY INT’L, available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/ourwork/cases/china-shi-tao (arguing that Yahoo did little to “send a clear message
to Chinese authorities that censorship would not be tolerated” before ending its
operations in China).
70 See Chander, Googling Freedom, supra note 41, at 37 (“[If] U.S. corporations
do choose to abandon repressive states, this abandonment will leave a hole for
other companies, both indigenous and foreign, to fill; such companies may evince
less concern for human rights than their departing U.S. competitors.”).
71
William J. Cannici, Jr., The Global Online Freedom Act: A Critique of Its
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Although an approach favoring engagement where possible is not
one that is universally supported, it is worth considering where
such engagement would potentially be mutually beneficial to the
company and the citizens within the jurisdiction of the markets
served.
Finally, the third gap that is evinced by the experience of
Dodd-Frank’s specialized disclosure and that which is called for in
GOFA is that the prevailing view of corporate decision-making is
still meant to serve profit maximization and shareholder benefit.
Many state corporate statutes provide corporate managers a level
of discretion in decision making, allowing them to take into
account ethical and community-related considerations, even where
the decision may not directly benefit shareholders and promote
corporate profit.72 However, as stated by Anupam Chander, legal
scholar on globalization and technology, “many academics and
courts would still encourage or require managers to justify these
extra-shareholder considerations as redounding ultimately to
benefit the shareholder’s pocketbook.”73 Thus, although human
rights considerations may be part of the calculus for companies
operating overseas, current corporate governance of U.S.
companies indicates that profit-making objectives are still the
driving force behind corporate decision-making.
As delineated previously, Dodd-Frank Section 1502 was
challenged on numerous grounds related to its alleged irrelevance
to shareholder interests. In response to challenges mounted
against the SEC final rule by industry actors, the SEC has
responded that although compliance with the rule might come at a
cost borne by shareholders and could negatively impact allocative
efficiency, indirect benefits would be received in the form of
greater investment by socially conscious investors and
consumers.74 The envisioned increase in demand would be based
Objectives, Methods, and Ultimate Effectiveness Combating American Businesses that
Facilitate Internet Censorship in the People’s Republic of China, 32 SETON HALL LEGIS. J
123, 144 (2007).
72
See AM. L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, § 2.01(b) (1994)
(“Even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced, the
corporation, in the conduct of its business . . . [m]ay take into account ethical
considerations that are reasonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible
conduct of the business”).
73 Chander, Googling Freedom, supra note 49, at 22.
74 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, No. 13-cv-635 (RLW), 2013 WL 4010670, at 21
n.14 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,350).
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on the idea that investors would not want to invest in companies
that cannot disclose their minerals to be “DRC Conflict Free”
because of reputational risk realized by the publishing of such
information. David M. Lynn, former Chief Counsel of the Division
of Corporation Finance at the SEC, opined that “this seems to be a
circular argument given that, for the most part, the issuer would
not have been required to perform due diligence on the supply
chain and provide any disclosure regarding the use of conflict
minerals absent Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act.”75
Additionally, the percentage of investors and consumers that use
their leverage for socially responsible investment decisions
regarding conflict minerals is not yet significant enough to effect
large-scale change in corporate policies.
Although similar arguments have been made by opponents of
the reporting requirements set forth in GOFA, human rights issues
faced by ICT companies are more relevant to shareholder value
and traditional economic concerns than those faced by companies
using conflict minerals. This is because there are fewer degrees of
separation between investors and consumers and the human rights
abuses committed by foreign governments, making ICT company
policy with regard to human rights a more relevant consideration.
The victims of human rights abuses in the DRC are less directly
related to the supply chain or consumer base of U.S. companies
selling products containing conflict minerals. In contrast, a victim
whose data is provided to a repressive government by their
Internet service provider is the consumer himself. This distinction,
where the consumer may “stand as the unwilling victim of a tort
rather than the beneficiary of a freely made contract[,]” has led to
the argument that “unadulterated profit maximization – including
acting in a manner indifferent to the political freedoms of one’s
patrons – becomes unethical.”76
Therefore, the traditional
argument that SEC specialized corporate disclosure related to
human rights concerns is beyond the scope of the SEC’s traditional
rulemaking authority may not carry as much weight in the
freedom of expression and privacy context.
The particular impact of corporate operations on human rights
75 David M. Lynn, The Dodd-Frank Act’s Specialized Corporate Disclosure: Using
the Securities Laws to Address Public Policy Issues, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 327, 336 (2011).
76
Chander, supra note 41, at 25 (exploring the arguments of the “Global
Shareholder Wealth Maximization” view of the social responsibility of
corporations).
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abuses thus appears to be more direct with Internet privacy than
the sale of conflict minerals, supporting the need for a corporate
accountability mechanism for ICT companies operating in
restrictive regimes. However, many important players argue that
an SEC rule is not the best means of achieving corporate
accountability in the Internet privacy realm, as it might have been
for conflict minerals. These actors argue that SEC rules should not
be incorporated into GOFA because the SEC is already
overburdened and should not be dealt yet another challenge in
determining the materiality for investors of online privacy issues.77
Although experts such as Bennett Freeman, of SRI mutual fund
company Calvert Investments, believe that a materiality argument
exists for investors with regard to Internet privacy, they believe
that GOFA is much less likely to become law with the SEC
reporting requirement because of the burden on the SEC.78 In
October 2013, Mary Jo White, Chairman of the SEC, addressed the
issue in discussing the future of corporate disclosure requirements
in a speech at the 2013 Leadership Conference for the National
Association of Corporate Directors.79 In her speech, the Chairman
identified the danger of “information overload” to investors that
may occur where too much required disclosure could make it very
difficult for investors to sort through the information to determine
what is relevant to their decision-making.80 Many actors involved
in the development of corporate accountability mechanisms for
ICT companies took this as an indication that SRIs and NGOs
should choose their battles carefully when it comes to supporting
the promulgation of further SEC rules.81 Although this paper does
not delve into the merits of the various other options for corporate
accountability aside from specialized corporate disclosure, it
should be noted that this position does exist and helps validate the
concern that passage of the corporate disclosure required by
77
Telephone Interview with Bennett Freeman, Senior Vice President for
Sustainability Research and Policy, Calvert Investments (Nov. 21, 2013).
78 Id.
79 See generally Mary Jo White, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address at
the National Association of Corporate Directors – Leadership Conference 2013:
The
Path
Forward
on
Disclosure
(Oct.
15,
2013),
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539878806#.UscKJBaTPj
A.
80
Id. (discussing the concern for the disproportionate number of SEC
disclosure requirements leading to an “’information overload’”).
81 Telephone Interview with Bennett Freeman, supra note 77.
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proposed GOFA rule may, like the Dodd-Frank rule, be a
challenging and unlikely possibility.
The experience of Dodd-Frank Section 1502 and the current
pitfalls in using specialized corporate disclosure to hold companies
accountable for human rights abuses under foreign governments
teaches us a number of lessons about the efforts needed to make
the proposed GOFA disclosure requirements effective. In general,
there must be a more integrated approach to conducting due
diligence and using the obtained information to affect change in
practices industry wide. Accordingly, a greater number of major
companies, relevant NGOs, investors, governments and other
industry actors should become involved in multi-stakeholder
initiatives to forge a more cooperative approach to complying with
the standards set forth by reporting requirements. Legislators and
other administrators involved in the implementation of both
Dodd-Frank Section 1502 and, potentially, GOFA Section 201
recognize the utility of an established and uniform framework to
guide due diligence expectations.82 In issuing its final rule on
conflict minerals, the SEC stated they were persuaded by the
commentators that using “a nationally or internationally
recognized due diligence framework . . . will enhance the quality of
an issuer’s due diligence, promote comparability of the Conflict
Minerals Reports of different issuers, and provide a framework by
which auditors can assess an issuer’s due diligence.”83 The
growing support by lawmakers for a designated due diligence
framework is evidenced by the Safe Harbor provision in GOFA
exempting issuers participating in multi-stakeholder initiatives
from reporting separately on human rights due diligence. The
need for an established due diligence framework provided through
multi-stakeholder initiatives is further underscored by the
recognition of legislators involved in the drafting of Dodd-Frank
and GOFA specialized corporate disclosure that the SEC will not
be able to verify much of the due diligence methods used by
companies on its own.84
82
See Conflict Minerals Release, supra note 6 (noting that the proposed rule
was modified to include adherence to the established OECD framework); see also
H.R. 491, 113th Cong. § 201 (1st Sess. 2013) (including a Safe Harbor provision
exempting issuers participating in good standing with a multi-stakeholder
initiative from the human rights due diligence reporting requirements).
83 See Conflict Minerals Release, supra note 6, at 12 (discussing the new rule
pursuant to Dodd-Frank Section 1502 relating to the use of conflict minerals).
84
Telephone Interview with Shelly Han, Policy Advisor for Economics,
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Greater involvement in multi-stakeholder initiatives is also
important to the effective use of specialized corporate disclosure to
change ICT company practices because it encourages cooperation
between the various actors involved. Cooperation among NGOs,
investors, governments, companies, and other actors means more
dialogue among stakeholders to “exchange feedback to develop
operational approaches to address adverse human rights risks and
impacts.”85 Unlike the “naming and shaming” approach, the
exchange of ideas and increased dialogue between invested actors
will give companies positive reinforcement and assist in the
development of strategies that can be replicated in each country in
which a company chooses to operate. Cooperative and mutually
beneficial relationships with other involved actors would prevent
companies from withdrawing from certain markets for fear of bad
publicity, and would instead empower them to put in place longterm policy changes. Michael Samway, former deputy general
counsel of Yahoo!, recognized this benefit of participation in multistakeholder initiatives in stating that “[f]orming institutional
partnerships and developing relationships of trust in those
stakeholder communities allows for confidential consultations and
input invaluable to companies in mitigating risk and in creating
value.”86 In this way, a cooperative grouping of stakeholders lends
itself to ICT companies providing more reliable services to its
consumers. The dialogue facilitated by multi-stakeholder
initiatives thus better serves the objectives of specialized corporate
disclosure for ICT companies.
Finally, greater participation in multi-stakeholder initiatives
would speed up the process of complying with disclosure
requirements in GOFA. Recalling the procedural implementation
of the SEC final rule promulgated through Dodd-Frank, it could
take many years before a finalized rule is passed containing the

Environment, Technology and Trade, Comm’n on Sec. & Cooperation in Eur.
(Nov. 5, 2013).
85
INT’L CORP. ACCT. ROUNDTABLE, “KNOWING AND SHOWING”: USING U.S.
SECURITIES LAWS TO COMPEL HUMAN RIGHTS DISCLOSURE 24 (2013) [hereinafter
“KNOWING AND SHOWING”] (discussing multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs)
developed to address concerns relating to human rights).
86 Michael A. Samway, Business, Human Rights, and the Internet: A Framework
for Implementation, in HUMAN DIGNITY AND THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS 295
(Mark P. Lagon & Anthony Clark Arend eds.,, 2014) [hereinafter Business and
Human Rights] (discussing the role of corporations in assessing human rights risks
that arise).
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requirements outlined in GOFA. Considering that GOFA itself has
not yet been passed, the timeframe for implementation of
disclosure requirements for ICT companies is indefinite.
Companies that join or have already joined multi-stakeholder
initiatives like the GNI will in the meantime be establishing a
practice for conducting human rights due diligence without any
legal duty being placed on them. As noted by a lead congressional
staffer involved in the drafting of GOFA, the hope among
legislators supporting GOFA is that even before reporting
requirements are elaborated, “Internet users and companies feel
responsible for what is going on,” so that real progress can be
made in changing industry practice.87 Multi-stakeholder initiatives
serve the dual purpose of providing a framework for the reporting
requirements in GOFA and reducing the compliance burden
placed on companies.
A second recommendation for more effective use of specialized
corporate disclosure for ICT companies would be increasing
shareholder and investor awareness on freedom of expression and
privacy issues faced by the ICT sector. Greater investor awareness
would lead to more informed investment decisions that would
utilize the information used in reporting to influence company
decision making to make more socially conscious decisions. The
movement for Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) has
spearheaded this concept, with the understanding that company
decision making is still focused on the derived benefit of the
shareholder and investor. Thus, changing the considerations for
corporate decision making “comes down to whether consumers
want to use these products, and whether shareholders want to
invest in these companies.”88 Changing the corporate calculus
through investor activism has centered on the challenge of proving
the materiality of human rights issues in corporate operations.89
The standards outlined by the SEC and U.S. Supreme Court in
determining whether a disclosure is material is ambiguous and
flexible, but places emphasis on the “reasonable investor.”90 SRI
Telephone Interview with Shelly Han, supra note 84.
Telephone Interview with Bennett Freeman, supra note 77.
89 See “KNOWING AND SHOWING,” supra note 85, at 14 (“The second part of the
disclosure process requires a subjective filtering of information related to required
disclosure items through a screen of materiality, with the goal of ensuring that
public disclosures are useful to investors and shareholders in assessing current
and prospective corporate performance.”).
90
Id. (citing TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)
87
88
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groups and NGOs have made efforts in support of both the conflict
minerals and ICT reporting requirements to show that the reported
information, though under the umbrella of human rights, is
material to a growing number of investors.91 More shareholder
awareness and activism efforts like these will change the
expectations of the “reasonable investor” and will improve the
leverage of socially responsible investors to change corporate
decision making. As summarized by Bennett Freeman, “the more
we can demonstrate the materiality of the issues we raise, the more
ground we will gain, both with the companies we are determined
to influence and the investors we seek to attract.”92
Greater shareholder and investor awareness will incentivize
companies to focus on the long-term impact of their operations in
other countries. The corporate response to negative media
attention on human rights issues has typically been a “windowdressing” strategy to create a temporary resolution to the problem
without actually changing company practice in the long-term.93
The real incentive to change long-term policy, however, will come
from the marketplace.94 Changes in shareholder and investor
decisions thus have more impact on a company’s reputation,
because it goes directly to the heart of the company’s quantitative
value. Greater investor awareness and shareholder activism
drawing upon the availability of reported information will be the
push companies need to adopt significant changes that will be
enforced in the long run. In the context of the ICT sector, investors
and NGOs pushing for responsible corporate policies in line with
the GOFA reporting requirements recognize that “[s]tanding up
against government censorship and surveillance requirements that
are in clear violation of international human rights norms is an
for the proposition that “[a] fact is material if ‘there is a substantial likelihood that
a reasonable investor would consider it important’ and would have viewed the
information ‘as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made
available.’”).
91
See, e.g. Letter from SIF and ICCR, supra note 18 (discussing the investor
materiality argument for conflict minerals disclosure requirements and
commenting on SEC proposed rule).
92
ICONS Interview Series: Rebecca Adamson of First Peoples Worldwide
Interviews Bennett Freeman of Calvert Investments, GREEN MONEY J. (Spring 2013),
http://www.greenmoneyjournal.com/spring-2013/icons/ [hereinafter ICONS
Interview Series] (discussing corporate governance as one of Calvert’s top priorities
for the year).
93 Telephone Interview with Michael Samway, supra note 52.
94 Telephone Interview with Shelly Han, supra note 84.
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investment in the Internet’s long-term sustainability and long-term
value.”95 In this way, increased investor awareness and advocacy
can “contribute to . . . investment performance by challenging
company directors and managements to focus on the long-term
drivers of success.”96
In addition to incentivizing companies to implement long-term
change in policy, greater awareness and activism among
shareholders will also lead to changes in practice industry-wide.
Once the message has been sent to corporate management that
human rights information required in SEC specialized corporate
disclosure requirements is material to investors and an important
part of their investment decisions, companies will be forced to
change their practices or risk their market share.97 Therefore,
investor activism and emphasis placed on socially responsible
decision-making creates
industry-wide
competition
and
differentiates those companies who change their practices from
those who do not. A shift toward socially responsible investment
will create a new set of expectations for companies, based on
accountability and transparency.98 During the drafting of the final
SEC rule on conflict minerals, a commentator argued that
compliance with a final rule could put all corporate actors within
the industry on a level playing field in terms of expectations.99 In
order for this to occur, compliance with the reporting requirements
must be combined with shareholder activism to change
expectations of companies on the industry level.
A third and final recommendation for the effective use of
specialized corporate disclosure requirements to hold companies
accountable for complicity in human rights abuses overseas is the
need for more substantial internal initiatives within companies
95 See MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED, supra note 18, at 178 (noting
how companies have been building corporate responsibility and sustainability
strategies).
96
See ICONS Interview Series, supra note 92 (discussing how shareholder
advocacy and public policy engagement can contribute to Calvert’s investment
performance).
97 Telephone Interview with Bennett Freeman, supra note 77.
98 See Conflict Minerals Release, supra note 6, at 8 (noting the suggestion of a
commentator to the proposed rule that the final rule on reporting could prepare
“companies to meet a new generation of expectations for greater supply chain
transparency and accountability.”).
99
See id. (“This commentator argued that such benefits could include
eliminating any competitive disadvantage to companies already engaged in
ensuring their conflict mineral purchases do not fund conflict in the DRC . . . .”).
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themselves. This internal mechanism should be based on a team of
professionals employed by the company who are primarily
responsible for looking into potential human rights challenges that
may be faced each time a company takes an action outside of the
United States. The team should be a permanent fixture in the
company and should consist of senior-level operational support.100
Most importantly, the internal structure should involve legal
analysis of relevant laws in theory and practice, and how these
laws as they currently exist will impact a company’s operations.
The analysis would not simply be based on an effective public
relations or marketing strategy; thus allowing companies to
implement strategies to understand the human rights issues
beyond the regulatory framework of each country in which they
operate.101 It has been argued that a major flaw with “corporate
social responsibility” departments that exist in almost every major
company today is their failure to incorporate the various human
rights challenges encountered by their business into the company’s
day-to-day operations.102 An initiative particular to business and
human rights would therefore be one that specifically addresses
legal frameworks in other countries and how they impact a
company’s work. Employing a business and human rights
program, like that developed by Yahoo! and described in this
paper, should be done separate from the corporate social
responsibility objectives involving public relations and marketing.
According to Michael Samway, this differentiation helps to prevent
efforts from being diminished by the perception “that those
corporate functions have less input and decision-making authority
on critical legal, regulatory, and policy decisions.”103
Internal initiatives will also provide a framework that can be
applied with modification to each country or situation in which
companies face human rights challenges. Similar to the argument
100 See Business and Human Rights, supra note 86, at 304 (arguing that “relying
on regular board decisions is less effective than positioning that responsibility in
the hands of a dedicated team that has executive officer input and support and the
ability to act with sufficient speed, understanding, and resources.”).
101 Telephone Interview with Michael Samway, supra note 52.
102 See Business and Human Rights, supra note 86, at 299–300 (arguing that the
corporate social responsibility approach has not kept up with the new challenges
faced by potential human rights abuses in foreign jurisdictions that come as a
direct result of a company’s products or services, with particular reference to the
ICT sector).
103 Id. at 305.
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previously made regarding the benefits of participation in multistakeholder initiatives, internal initiatives on business and human
rights would allow companies to develop and implement a
standardized set of practices with regard to tackling human rights
issues in their operations. The difference here, obviously, is that
the framework would largely come from within as opposed to
being significantly informed by NGO and investor members of a
multi-stakeholder group. Both approaches serve the important
function of organizing the policies and procedures necessary to
embed the practice of addressing human rights into the company
itself, an approach supported by internationally agreed-upon
principles of the corporate responsibility to respect human
rights.104 It is important for companies to establish their own
internal mechanisms by which they carry out due diligence and
address human rights in their business so they can adequately
prepare themselves to comply with reporting requirements while
also catering their efforts to the unique identity of their company.
It is certain to take a significant amount of time before any rule for
ICT companies is implemented (if it becomes law at all), but if
companies take steps and modify their practices with reporting in
mind they will be better prepared to comply with reporting
requirements if they are made into law. Aside from the demands
of potential reporting requirements, an established commitment
and protocol dedicated to business and human rights developed
internally will also allow “more advanced planning and
thoughtfulness in crisis anticipation, resolution, and avoidance.”105
An example of an internal initiative within the business and
human rights framework in the ICT sector is that of Yahoo!’s
Human Rights Impact Assessment (“HRIA”) in Vietnam, which
was created in the wake of the reputational damage to the
company caused by the Shi Tao incident in China. Yahoo! has
publicly committed to carrying out HRIAs to investigate human
rights and rule of law in countries in which they operate.106 These
assessments are used to decide whether to operate within a given
See JOHN GERARD RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
HUMAN RIGHTS 113 (Kwame Anthony Appiah ed., 2013) (“An explicit policy
commitment is necessary in order to embed the responsibility to respect human
rights within a company.”).
105 Business and Human Rights, supra note 86, at 305.
106
Human Rights Impact Assessments, YAHOO! BUS. & HUM. RTS. PROGRAM,
http://www.yhumanrightsblog.com/blog/our-initiatives/human-rights-impactassessments/.
104
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country.107 Additionally, HRIAs could be used to decide whether
to develop a strategic plan to designate potential human rights
risks and devise strategies to deal with those risks should they
arise in the course of operation. The company considers a number
of factors when completing an HRIA that allow it to assess the
human rights impacts of entering a new market or introducing a
new product.108 Yahoo! completed an internally driven HRIA in
Vietnam before deciding whether to offer country-specific services
to Vietnamese users.109 In carrying out the assessment, Yahoo!
sought to look beyond the regulatory framework of a country
codified in law and communicated with relevant actors on the
ground to determine how the framework was applied in
practice.110 Based on the information obtained in its HRIA, Yahoo!
determined that Vietnam’s restrictive practices toward Vietnamese
bloggers posed a threat to the company’s ability to be able to
uphold rights to freedom of expression and privacy to their users if
they were to operate within the country.111 As a result, it decided
to instead set up Vietnamese-language operations in Singapore,
where less risk existed.112
Yahoo!’s HRIA initiative in Vietnam represents another benefit
of internal company initiatives that could supplement the use of
specialized corporate disclosure to change industry practice.
Yahoo!’s HRIA is particularly important to note because it was a
preventative measure used to measure the risk environment with
regard to human rights if Yahoo! were to open up operations in
Vietnam.
These types of internal company initiatives are
consistent with the goals of the proposed GOFA requirements
because they provide a means by which companies can avoid
Id.
See id. (listing the relevant factors considered in conducting HRIAs,
including: “international legal and moral foundations for the rights to freedom of
expression and privacy”; “[t]he general human rights landscape in the relevant
country or region, with a particular focus on rule of law, free expression and
privacy”; “local laws about free expression and privacy”; “Yahoo!’s business and
product plans for entry into the market”; “[t]he existing and potential benefits of
the Internet to the citizens of the relevant region or country”; “[r]isk scenarios
based on Yahoo!’s products and operations”; “recommendations to avoid or
mitigate those risks”; and “[recommendations] to protect and promote free
expression and privacy [in the relevant region or country].”).
109 Telephone Interview with Michael Samway, supra note 52.
110 Id.
111 MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED, supra note 18, at 181.
112 Id.
107
108
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future complications by applying due diligence measures prior to
entering new markets. If companies like Yahoo! are able to
determine beforehand whether the risks are too great to enter a
market, it could avoid discovering unfavorable information later
on if and when corporate disclosure is required. Consequently,
with the proposed GOFA reporting requirements and greater SRI
interest in mind, it is a smart business decision for companies to
take preventative measures to ensure they will not be negatively
impacted further down the line.
Even without mandated
disclosure, companies still have a strong incentive to employ
preventative practices because those companies that have already
begun to implement such programs have a competitive advantage
where providing similar products. The preventative approach is
not only practical but also in line with multi-stakeholder initiatives
and recognized international models for business and human
rights that are becoming increasingly popular and are cited with
growing frequency among lawmakers.113
Specialized corporate disclosure is an important and growing
mechanism by which U.S. companies operating in the context of
weak human rights regimes can be held accountable for their
actions abroad. The experience and major criticisms of the
specialized corporate disclosure requirements enforced regarding
conflict minerals can inform us of the prospects for other potential
specialized corporate disclosure initiatives, including the human
rights due diligence requirement in Section 201 of the Global
Online Freedom Act. Based on a comparison of both rules and the
industries that would fall under their purview, the major barriers
to implementation of the specialized corporate disclosure approach
as it stands are: transparency achieved through reporting is only
the first step of the accountability mechanism; the danger that
“naming and shaming” could antagonize companies to carry out
less-than-ideal solutions to avoid public shaming; and the
113
See GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE, IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES FOR THE
PRINCIPLES ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND PRIVACY 2 (2012) (stating that
participants should use HRIAs to “identify circumstances when freedom of
expression and privacy may be jeopardized or advanced, and develop
appropriate risk mitigation strategies . . .” including when “[e]ntering new
markets, particularly those where freedom of expression and privacy are not well
protected.”); see also RUGGIE, supra note 104, at 112–13 (explaining that the
corporate responsibility to respect enshrined in the United Nations Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights requires that companies assess
potential human rights impacts and address potential adverse impacts through
prevention and mitigation).
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corporate decision making calculus is still focused on profit
maximization and shareholder benefit. Despite these obstacles,
specialized corporate disclosure can still be used as an effective
means of holding companies accountable for human rights impacts
overseas and to change industry practice to be more in line with
concerns of business and human rights, but it must be part of a
coordinated approach involving all affected actors. To that end, it
is recommended that there be greater company participation in
multi-stakeholder initiatives aimed at implementing business and
human rights strategies in ICT companies, greater investor
awareness and shareholder activism at work to use information
published to change company decision making, and greater
internal initiatives within the companies themselves to bolster the
company’s commitment to human rights.
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